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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEILA R. BROWN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
7475

-vs.THOMAS E. BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and respondent agrees that the statement of facts in appellant and defendant's brief is true
with the following exception: On page 3 of appellant's
brief is the statement that defendant had testified uthat he
did not spend any part of his income on drink or entertainment." Defendant did in fact testify that he went
to two or three movies during the month of September,
1949 (R. 52) and possibly some movies during October,
1949 (R. 52) and that he sometimes took his new wife
and her family. It is true that he later on testified that
1
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he did not remember going to a movie· during October,
1949 (R. 52), but he does not deny going.
The Court must know the following facts also before
determining the matter before the Court:
As shown by the judgment upon an order to show
cause of the same District Court dated January 6, 1949 (R.
10-12) the defendant had been found guilty herein of
contempt of court for failure to pay support money to
plaintiff for the support of the two minor children of the
parties and defendant had been sentenced to a ten day
suspended sentence in jail and plaintiff had been given
judgment for accrued and unpaid support money owing
to her by defendant in the sum of $707.50 plus costs and
$50.00 attorneys' fees.
The defendant continued to ignore the order of Court
(R. 13-15) and allowed the accrued and unpaid support
money owjng under the decree to increase to $1,112.5 0
plus costs. Thereupon, the second order to show cause· dated
August 3, 1949 (R. 16, R. 18) was issued. On August
15th, 1949, just a few minutes before the hearing on the
latter order to show cause was to commence, Mr. Edward
Clyde, defendant's counsel, contacted plaintiff, through
her counsel, and advised plaintiff that defendant could
never possibly pay the accrued and unpaid support money
then due, and made, for his client, the following offer:
That defendant pay $500.00 cash in full payment of the
$1,112.50 unpaid and due support money and in full satisfaction of the outstanding judgment which included costs
and attorneys' fees, and that defendant be en~couraged to
remain current by being given the financial incentive of
having the monthly installment decreased from $60.00 a
2
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month to $40.00 a month with the provision that if he
defaulted and remained in default for thirty days the payments would automatically increase again to the former
amount of $60.00 a month. The offer required the decrease in payments if defendant was to pay plaintiff the
$500.00 cash, so plaintiff reluctantly accepted the offer.
Thereafter, appellant's counsel composed and authored
the stipulation of the parties dated August 25, 1949 (R.
16-17) and the decree of the same date ( R. 18 -19) . Thereupon, Mr. O'Donnell, in the presence of defendant's counsel, warned the complaining respondent that if she ever
allowed defendant to default again and remain in default
for more than thirty days without advising her attorneys
to commence action, she must find other counsel and
defendant's counsel was advised to tell appellant of this
warning. (The foregoing was presented in uncontested
statements to the court by counsel, but not placed in the
transcript by the recorder except as ureading from the files
and discussion," R. 40.)
Thereafter, defendant became in default $40.00 and
respondent commenced this action.

STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH RESPONDENT INTENDS TO RELY FOR
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT
1. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR

WHEN IT FOUND AND ADJUDICATED DEFENDANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
2. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR

IN MODIFYING THE ORDER ENTERED UPON
AUGUST 25, 1949, AND IN REINSTATING THE
ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949.
3
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3. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR

IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF
A $50.00 COUNSEL FEE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR
WHEN IT FOUND AND ADJUDICATED DEFENDANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
This point is in answer to ((~oint I" commencing on
page 5 of appellant's brief and' entitled, uThe District
Court Erroneously Found and Adjudicated Defendant To
Be In Contempt of Court."
. Appellant admits on page 5 of his brief that defendant
did not ·comply with the District Court order entered
August 25, 1949 in that he failed to make the payments
in October and November as required and in that he was
in default in the sum of ·$20.00 at the time of the hearing.
We agree that defendant's failure must be willful, intentional or contumacious as he argues on page 5 of his
brief. However, the record shows ample evidence for .the ·
Court making the :finding of fact as follows:
((That defendant has willfully refused to comply
with the Order of this Court." ( R. 27.)
The record shows that from October 1, 1949 until, and
including, the day of the hearing on November 15, 1949
defendant was continuously in default in the payments of
4
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the support money for his two children, then age 9 years and
8 years respectively, under the terms of the decree dated
August 25, 1949 in sums ranging from $40.00 to never
less than $20.00 (R. 41-44). Although defendant knew
since at least November 4, 1949 (R. 24-25) that he must
appear before the District Court and testify as to why
he had failed to comply with the order of Court dated
August 25, 1949 (R. 18-19) requiring him to pay $20.00
on the 1st and 15th day respectively of each and every
month, and although defendant was a vete·ran at such
hearings, and although defendant had the advice of competent counsel who also knew that he must testify regarding his earnings and· expenditures, defendant appeared
at the hearing without any records of accounts and without any useful knowledge as to his finances and unable
to testify exactly as to anything pertaining to his finances.
All of his testimony as to earnings was b-ased upon his own
guessing and vague estimates (R. 46, R. 48-49). The
defendant knew the terms of the order (R. 17, R. 43) and,
therefore, it is incumbent upon him, since he admits (R.
41-43) that he did not pay in accordance with the terms of
the order, to show an inability to pay as a matter of
defence.
((If the petitioner had knowledge of the contents of the decree, then it must follow as an unanswerable conclusion that he knew that he had not
complied with the order. Having knowledge of the
contents of the decree, it was incumbent upon him
to show that he had complied therewith if such were
the fact. Where it is made to appear in the affidavit
that the party whose duty it was to pay the alimony
had knowledge of the order re·quiring such payment,
the fact of payment or inability to pay is a matter of
defence." Hillyard vs. District Court of Cache
County, 249 Pac. 806 (Page 807) ; 68 Utah 220.
5
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We submit that defendant failed to prove an inability to
pay by such vague testimony as the following sample:
MR. WHITE: (CHow much money did you make in
November, up to the present time, (that is, the
1st to the 15th of November)?
MR. BROWN: ~.:I don't have those figures. I haven't a summary up the present time. ·
MR. WHITE: uwhat would you estimate your income to be·, since the first of the month?
MR. BROWN: rr About one hundred dollars to date.
MR. WHITE: (Cis that your gross income?
MR. BROWN: uThat is the net." (R. 46).
and this typical sample of testimony regarding his expenses:
MR. WHITE: uwhat other expenses?
MR. BROWN: ttl do not have a full summary. I
would have to go over my books to get the
amounts." (R. 49)
Defendant must be found guilty of willful failure to comply with the order of the Court, since he knew the terms
of the order and admits that he· did not comply with such
terms and failed to affirmatively prove his claimed defense of an inability to pay. Not only did defendant fail
to prove his only defense, but his very testimony showed
that he had the ability to pay, not only more money than
he did pay, but in accordance with the terms of the order.
The defendant testified that he had re-married since
he was divorced from respondent (R. 46), that he has no
children by his new wife (R. 54), that his new wife has
6
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three children of her own by a previous marriage (R. 54),
that he is not obligated for the support of his new wife's
children (R. 55), that he does buy the groceries for his
new wife and her children (R. 55), that his grocery bill
varies but ~mounts to approximately $20.00 a week (R.
48), that he went to two or three shows in September (R.
49), that it is possible that he went to some movies during
October (R. 52), and that he sometimes takes his wife
and her children with him to movies (R. 52). Under
the terms of the Court order (R. 18-19) defendant was
to pay respondent $20.00 support money on October 1st
and $20.-00 more on October 15th, but defendant made
only one payment during the entire month of O·ctober (R.
41)-a $20.00 payment on October 30th. Therefore, defendant became in default in his payments on October 1st
and has never been current since that day. Defendant by
his testimony, consequently, admits that it is possible that
he went to some movies during October (R. 52) while in
default in his payments, and only later after some thought
does he become even more vague than usual by testifying
that, ((During October I can't renzember going to a movie."
(R. 53). If defendant had given respondent only one half
of the said eighty dollars a month grocery money for the
use of his own children, he would have been current under
the terms of the order. If defendant had given respondent
the money he spent on s4ows he would have ·Conformed
more to the terms of the decree than he actually did. The
District Court made findings of fact as follows:
((That defendant has paid money on other expenses
and costs that he could have paid as support money
for said minor children; and that defendant has
refused and failed to support said minors to his
maximum ability." (R. 27.)
7
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That money defendant possibly spent on a movie while in
default could have been used to apply on his support money
payments then in default and would have bought his own
two children at least a quart of milk. The defendant, by
the testimony we have quoted heretofore, testified that he
made $100.00 net during the first fifteen days of November (R. 45), but he only paid respondent, from the $100.0-0
net that he earned during November up to the day of the
hearing, the sum of $20.00 on November 7th (R. 42)
although he was in default at all times during said month.
The District Court had no choice but to believe that the
respondent was e·ntitled to a larger share of that $100.00
in order to support defendant's two little children, and that
defendant was capable of paying respondent a larger share
of his November earnings.
On pages 6 and 7 of appellant's brief, defendant's attorneys have made the assumption that defendant's new
wife and her thre·e childr~n were in financial straits, but
there is no evidence to substantiate this belief. There is no
evidence as to the ages of ,the new wife's children or as to
their respective income or as to whether they are dependent
upon anyone. Defendant testified that his present wife's
children are not obligated to him for their support (R. 55).
The only evidence he offered .regarding the finances of his
present wife, is that she owns an automobile (R. 53) and
that she is not employed (R. 53) . Defendant did testify
that he buys groceries for his present wife and her children (R. 48) and that his grocery expenses are about $20.00
a week (R. 48) ; but even five persons can eat on that much
money and not have uhungry mouths" (page 6 of his
brief). Appellant is right in the admission that in legal
contemplation his first duty is to support his own two
children. He had no right to place himself in a position
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deliberately where he could not comply with the order of
the Court, if he is unable to support his own children as
a result of marrying another wife who already had three
children of her own. Van Hoosear vs. Railroad Commission of California, 207 Pac. 905; 189 Cal. 23 3 (cited with
approval in Hillyard vs. District Court of Cache County,
supra).
The defendant testified (R. 45) that there is no regular
day upon which he receives any income and that he is selfemployed. Under such circumstances it is incumbent upon
defendant to arrange his financial affairs in such a manner
that he is able to pay his support money obligations as each
becomes due by keeping some money in reserve from higher
income months over into lower income months. Instead
of arranging his affairs in this manner during September,
defendant spent, according to his testimony, all of the
money that he earned. Thus, he testified that on O·ctober
1st, 1949 he had no money with which to pay the support
money payment that became due on that day (R. 43).
Appellant has the audacity on page 6 of his brief to
state that he demonstrated his ((good faith" by borrowing
$500.00 from his father to pay the accrued and unpaid
support money owing to respondent prior to the order
dated August 25, 1949. Defendant had been hailed into
Court on an Order to Show Cause, he had previously been .
found in contempt of Court at another hearing (R. 1012), he had previously been given a suspended jail sentence
(R. 10-12), he was in default under the terms of the decree
in the sum of $1,112.50 (R. 13-15), he might well go to
jail this time, he sa~ an opportunity to settle $1,112.50
unpaid support money plus court costs including a judgment for attorneys' fees by paying the comparative pittance
9
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of $500.00, and he persuaded respondent to take $20.00 a
month less support money by promising to remain current
thereafter (R. 16-17, R. 18-19). The defendant made one
of the best bargains for himself by that day's work that he
will ever make. Although respondent was enticed to accept his offer,-when he waived the promise of $500.00 before her' eyes while knowing how badly their children
needed the money, she certainly was not satisfied with any
part of the transaction. If defendant had shown good faith
at that time, he would have borrowed the $500.00 and
paid it to apply upon the judgment standing against him
(R. 10-12) , and not required that the payments be diminished as an incentive to support his own flesh and blood in
a lesser manner than the Court had previously adjudicated
that he was capable of paying.
The appellant on page 7 of his brief complains that the
District Court was harsh when it sentenced him to jail for
the reason that such action would not help his children.
What other and milder means of enforcing its orders had
not been exhausted by the Court to no avail? The Court
had previously found defendant guilty of contempt of
court (R. 10-12) , it had hailed him before the Court on
three occasions by orders to show cause (R. 10-12, R. 1819, R. 20), it had given him a suspended jail sentence (R.
1 0-12) , and it had given him a financial incentive to kee·p
current by consenting that he pay $20.00 less each month
provided he did not default for thirty days (R. 18-19). The
District Court had exhausted all other coercive means of
forcing defendant to comply with its orders, and because
defendant still was in contempt of its orders it reluctantly
ordered him incarcerated.
uEven in an equity case we do not overturn the
judgment unless it is fairly against the preponder10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ance of the evidence. The writer believes that every
intendment should be in favor of the trial court, for
not only does he in a divorce case have the parties
before him, enabling him to test credibility by
demeanor, but the conduct and manner of the
parties in the court room sometimes gives much aid
in solving who really is at fault." Pinion vs. Pinion,
67 Pac. (2nd) 268; 92 Utah 262. Huber vs. Newman, 145 Pac. (2nd) 780; 106 Utah 363. Limb vs.
Limb, 195 Pac. (2nd) 263; _ _ Utah--·
POINT TWO
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
MODIFYING THE ORDER ENTERED UPON AUGUST 25,1949, AND IN REINSTATING THE ORDER
ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949.
This point is in answer to ((point two" commencing
on page 7 of appellant's brief and entitled, ((The District
Court Erred In Modifying the Order Entered August 25,
1949, And In Reinstating the Order Entered January 6,
1949."
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the order dated August 25,
1949 (R. 18-19) read as follows:
,
u3. That the order of the Court, entered in the
above entitled case on the 27th day of June, 1947,
as modified by the order of the court entered in the
above entitled case on the 6th day of January, 1949,
requiring the defendant to pay to t~e plaintiff the
sum of $60.00 per month for the care and support
of the two minor ~children of the plaintiff and the
defendant be- and the same is hereby modified and
henceforth the defendant shall be required to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of $40.00 per month in two
11
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installments, to-wit: $20.00 on the 1st of each
month and $20.00 on the 15th of each month, with
the first payment to be made on or before September 1, 1949.
cc4. It is further ordered that in the event the
defendant shall default in the payment of the sum
of $40.00 per month as herein provided, and shall
remain in default for a period of thirty days, then
the provision of the decree heretofore entered requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of $60.00 per month for the care and support
of the two minor children of the parties shall be
automatically reinstated."
The intent of the parties, the intent of the Court and the
meaning of paragraph 4 was that if defendant defaulted
in the payment of the support money under the terms of
paragraph 3 of the order, and remained in default even one
cent for thirty consecutive days, the provisions of the
previous decree requiring defendant to pay $60.00 a month
be reinstated. Since appellant and defendant's attorneys
worded the written stipulation and order, they are responsible for any ambiguity in the same.
The plan was suggested by Mr. Clyde for the sole
purpose of providing the consistently-defaulting defendant
with an incentive to remain current in his support money
obligation~, and Mr. Clyde ttsold" the plan to respondent
by assuring her that he had used it successfully on other
, defaulting fathers and by pointing out that she was not
receiving $60.00 a month anyway due to the defendant's
failure to pay and due to the expense of collecting default
payments by legal action. However, the interpretation that
appellant and his counsel now wish to use for paragraph
four would certainly encourage defendant to remain in
12
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default $39.99 at all times, and would absolutely defeat
the very intent of the plan to encourage· defendant to remain current.
The defendant was current on September 30, 1949 in
his payments under the terms of the order dated August
25, 1949, and, as shown by the stipulation of the parties in
open Court (R. 41-42) he only made two payments thereafter, one for $20.00 on October 30th and the other for
$20.00 on November 7th, 1949. Consequently, on October
1st, under the terms of paragraph three of the order, defendant became in default that payment of $20.00; he
remained thus in default until the October 15th payment
also became due so that he the·n owed $40.00; on October
30th he paid $20.00 on the debt leaving a balance of $20.00
owing; on November 1st another payment became due
and he again owed $40.00; and, after this action was commenced and he was served with a citation, he paid the
other $20.00 leaving him in default in the sum of $20.00
at the time of the hearing, since the November 15th payment, due on the day of the hearing, was not in default
until the last second of that day. On page 8 of his brief
appellant argues that udefendant was never in default in
any amount for a period of thirty days." We in turn ask,
at any time in what single day between October 2nd, 1949
and the time of the hearing on November 15th, 1949 was
defendant not in default at least $20.00? The defendant
himself answered this question at the hearing as follows:

MR. O'DONNELL: c:c:You have been in arrears at,
all times since October 1 until now?"

MR. BROWN: uYes." (R. 44.)
We compute that there are forty-five days that defendant

13
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was in default before the hearing, from October 2nd to
November 15th, 1949.
Appellant first argues in his brief that he must be in
default $40.00 before the prior decree can be reinstated
and at the end of this particular point two he apparently
argues that he must be in default one particular installment
for thirty days before said order is to be reinstated. However, paragraph four of the order never mentions installments, nor did the Court or the parties consider such a
fatuous plan when the order was rendered. Paragraph four
' was planned to provide the parties' children with necessary
money, and the children cannot eat by accounting entries.
This latter version of the appellant's interpretation of paragraph four would also encourage him to remain in default
one installment at all times, and thus again defeat the
very purpose of the plan.
The District Court properly ruled as follows (R. 5556):

uThe Court is further of the opinion that paragraph 4 of the Decree, entitled c:c:Order," dated
August 25, 1949, signed by Judge Roald A. Hogenson, covers this situation, and that the meaning of
it is that on the failure to pay a sum of forty dollars
per month ·over a period of time, as the evidence
shows here, is enough to revive the old provision,
and reinstate the requirement that he pay sixty dollars per month. The Court :finds that the Defendant
is in default, and the old Decree is reinstated, to pay
sixty dollars per month-thirty dollars December
1, and thirty dollars December 15, and each 1st and
15th thereafter.''
and the District Court made the following :finding of fact
(R. 28):
14
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ttThat the proper interpretation of the Order of
this Court' J1erein dated August 25th, 1949 and
designated as paragraph four is that the former
Decree requiring defendant to pay $60.00 a month
instead of only $40.00 shall be reinstated provided
defendant remains in default in the payn1ent of any
part of the support money payments for thirty days
and not merely if defendant defaults in the paytnent
of $40.00 for thirty days. That defendant has been
in default in the payment of support money for a
period in excess of thirty days."
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF A
$50.00 COUNSEL FEE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
This point is in answer to upoint three" commencing
on page 9 of appellant's brief and entitled, ((The District
Court Erred In Ordering Defendant To Pay Plaintiff A
$50.00 Counsel Fee Under the Circumstances."
The parties stipulated, through their counsel, in open
Court that $50.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee for the
Court to order defendant to pay plaintiff for the use and
benefit of her counsel for their services at the hearing,
providing that it was proper for the Court to order the
defendant to pay plaintiff any attorney's fees therein
R. 55).
Contrary to appellant's argument on page 9 of his
brief, he was $40.00 in arrears, instead of $20.00, when this
action was commenced and when he was served with a
citation on November 4, 1949 (R. 25, R. 41-42); but he
paid $20.00 on November 7, 1949 (R. 42), or three days
after service of the citation upon him, and thus was in
15
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arrears $20.00 at the time of the hearing. The citation
would have been properly brought though at the time it
was issued he had been only $20.00 in default.
The respondent was deprived ot over $650.00 by delaying in pressing her rights in Court in the past, as we
have heretofore explained. When respondent allowed the
unpaid support money to increase and accumulate, defendant required her to settle for much less than half the
amount due by arguing that he could never possibly accumulate sufficient money to pay the accrued debt. Now,
that respondent has learned her lesson, defendant has the
audacity to complain that she should wait for him to get
right back in the same hopeless condition that she relieved
him from before.
Next appellant complains that he was not given the
courtesy of a letter (Pages 9 and 10 of his brief) before
this action was commenced. Defendant had been sent letters on previous occasions, had been telephoned, had been
served with orders to show cause, had been hailed into
Court, had been found in contempt of Court, had been
given a suspended jail sentence, all to no avail. Further,
defendant's counsel had heard Mr. O'Donnell warn respondent to find. new attorneys if she allowed defendant
to default more than thirty days without advising them
to commence an action, and defendant's attorney had been
told to tell defendant of this advice. From past experience
respondent and her counsel knew that letters have no effect
on defendant. We do not need to apologize for not sending defendant a letter, for the law does not require one
to do a useless 'act. The defendant's past history must be
considered while judging whether the respondent and the
District Court acted harshly herein.
16
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The defendant on pages 9 and 10 of his brief argues
that the $500.00 that he paid respondent in August should·
have sufficiently satisfied respondent so that she should not
have commenced this action. The defendant maintains
that the payment of $500.00 places the respondent in a
position to pay her own legal expenses. The $500.00 paid
in accordance with the aforesaid agreement satisfied $1,112.50 unpaid support money and thus paid over eighteen
months accumulated unpaid support mone·y and brought
the payments current to the end of August, 1949. Surely
the defendant cannot expect the same $500.00 to support
the two children for a longer period of time than the said
eighteen months, nor can defendant expect respondent
to have sufficient of that money left to pay Court costs and
legal expenses made necessary by his further delinquencies ..
The respondent had been temporarily unemployed, one of
the parties' children has a heart ailment, and the respondent
has other expenses which have been set forth in her affidavit
in support of a motion to require defendant to pay attorneys' fees and certain costs. The respondent commenced
this action by an affidavit of impecuniosity (R. 3 2) , because she had no money with which to pay even the costs
in the District Court. However, the appellant frequently
concedes in his brief that the respondent and their children
are in :financial need, so we shall not further stress to the
Court the impossibility of respondent paying her own expenses. Davidson vs. Munsey, 180 Pac. 743; 29 Utah 181.
Appellant was in arrears $40.00 under the terms of the
order (R. 18-19) when the action was commenced, he was
$20.00 in arrears at the time of the hearing, the District
Court found that his default was willful, so it properly
ordered him to pay the costs and expenses incurred, which
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includes a reasonable attorneys' fee. Foreman vs. Foreman,
176 Pac (2nd) 144; 111 Utah 72.
What did respondent's attorneys accomplish by instituting this action? By instituting this action, defendant
( 1) was probably persuaded to pay that $20.00 payment
three days after he was served with the citation; (2) the
prior order was reinstated and the defendant was ordered
to pay $20.00 a month more support money than he had
been paying; and, ( 3) most important of all, perhaps the
defendant will be convinced finally that the respondent
and the Court insist that defendant consistently and regularly help support his two children.
The appellant suggests that the Supreme Court discourage mothers from commencing actions to require fathers who default in support money payments to comply
with the order of the District Court, until such time as
the unpaid installments accumulate to an important
amount. The policy suggested by appellant would encourage laxity upon the part of the t;nothers, by affirmatively
discouraging them from enforcing their rights. The appellant does not suggest how the children are to eat during
the interim while the unpaid installments accumulate to
an important amount. Unfortunately, too many fathers
are presently using the plan of the appellant, and allowing
the unpaid support money' payments to accumulate to
an amount which they can not possibly pay, then settling
the accumulated account for a much smaller lump sum
payment. From the experience of respondent's counsel,
we can collect $20.00 from any one much easier than we
can collect $1,112.50 from the same person.
The respondent has been too lenient in the past and
this attitude cost her over $650.00. Furthermore, why
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should the defendant be allowed to continue to pay a lesser
sum each month as support money, when he fails to remain
current which was the uconsideration" for these lowe·r
payments? The respondent agreed to accept a lesser sum
in the expectation that defendant would pay consistently
and regularly thereafter.
Respondent's counsel resent the implication on page
10 of appellant's brief that the expectation of counsel fees
might have influenced them to commence this action so
promptly. We remind appellant that in the past he has
never paid respondent's attorne·ys one cent in attorneys'
fees, although he was twice ordered to do so by the Court
(R. 10-12; R. 29-30). Further, we have commenced and
pressed this matter without receiving any compensation
from respondent. The respondent has no money or reasonable means of paying her counsel for defending this appeal,
and appellant should be required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of at least $100.00 for the
services of respondent's counsel in defending this appeal,
and also costs incurred herein.
CONCLUSIO·N
We, therefore, respectfully conclude that the judgment of the District Court should be sustained, and that
the respondent should be awarded costs and attorneys' fees
herein.
Respectfully submitted,

ELDRED J. WILDE
JOHN HAYS O'DONNELL,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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